Gulf Security After Hormuz: The GCC's Demand for a Seat at the Table

On June 25, 2026, the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) held a joint ministerial meeting in Manama, Bahrain, co-chaired by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the Bahraini foreign minister. According to the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the meeting included a discussion of the recent US-Iran memorandum of understanding and the mediation efforts being led by Pakistan and Qatar.

The Manama Consensus and the Limits of External Diplomacy

The meeting in Manama signaled a cautious acceptance of external diplomatic progress, specifically regarding the US-Iran memorandum of understanding. GCC ministers welcomed the memorandum and the mediation work of Pakistan and Qatar. The memorandum is between the United States and Iran; Qatar, one of the mediators, has stressed that Gulf states should be directly involved in shaping any long-term Hormuz arrangement.

Qatar stresses that Gulf states should be directly involved in shaping any long-term Hormuz arrangement.

Why It Matters

Qatar's position suggests it sees an arrangement that bypasses regional stakeholders as risky. If a security framework for the Strait of Hormuz is designed solely between Washington and Tehran, it may fail to address the specific territorial and sovereignty concerns of the littoral states.

Sovereignty and the Rejection of Maritime Tolls

A critical component of the regional stance involves the legal control of the Strait of Hormuz. In a statement addressed to international transit concerns, GCC nations rejected any attempts to assert control through tolls or fees in the Strait. This rejection is not merely a matter of economic preference but a defense of international maritime norms. Any attempt to impose transit costs would be seen as an assertion of control that undermines the principle of freedom of navigation.

The Bahraini foreign ministry has been explicit on this point: any future agreement regarding Hormuz must ensure that Iran respects the sovereignty of its neighbors and refrains from supporting militant proxies. This requirement links maritime security directly to the internal security of the GCC states. From an analytical perspective, the GCC is attempting to codify a security requirement: freedom of navigation cannot be separated from the non-interference of regional powers.

The Security-Trade Nexus: Reversibility as Strategy

Economic interdependence is being utilized as a strategic lever by the GCC. The current stance on trade and investment with Iran is described as "conditional and reversible." This mechanism allows the Gulf states to maintain economic ties while retaining the ability to withdraw those ties if security agreements are violated. In my analysis, this approach could serve several functions:

• It provides a non-kinetic response to maritime disruptions or proxy-driven threats.
• It creates a tangible cost for non-compliance with sovereignty-based agreements.
• It avoids the total decoupling that might be required by more rigid sanctions regimes.

This strategy of "conditional cooperation" suggests that for the GCC, economic integration is not an end in itself, but a tool of statecraft. If the US-Iran MoU fails to prevent attacks on shipping or the Houthi naval blockade of Saudi Arabia, the GCC could revert to a more restrictive economic stance. That would create a dual-track pressure: the US applies diplomatic and political pressure, while the GCC applies economic and transit-based pressure.

The Salalah Variable: Unconfirmed Regional Channels

While much of the diplomatic focus remains on the US-Iran-GCC nexus, reports suggest the emergence of alternative, regionalized diplomatic channels. According to a report from Kurs.com.ua, there is unconfirmed discussion regarding the possibility of GCC foreign ministers holding joint talks with Iran in Salalah, Oman. These talks, reportedly initiated by Oman, would focus on the future of the Strait of Hormuz.

If these Salalah-based negotiations were to materialize, they would represent a significant shift in the regional security terrain. Such a move would bypass the US-centric mediation models and prioritize a regional solution to maritime security. However, the status of these talks remains unconfirmed, and their success would depend on whether the outcomes are consistent with the sovereignty demands emphasized by Bahrain and Qatar.

Implications for Global Supply Chains

The ongoing instability, including the Houthi naval blockade of Saudi Arabia and various attacks on shipping, has turned maritime security into a primary concern for global logistics. The GCC's refusal to accept tolls or fees in Hormuz is a direct effort to prevent the Strait from becoming a site of contested jurisdiction or "taxation" by any regional power. For global investors and insurers, the primary risk is no longer just the presence of conflict, but the legal and jurisdictional uncertainty regarding who controls the passage of goods through these chokepoints.

The current environment is characterized by a tension between two types of stability: the diplomatic stability sought through the US-Iran MoU and the operational stability required by the GCC for safe transit. A gap between these two forms of stability could mean higher insurance premiums and volatility in shipping routes, regardless of the success of high-level diplomatic treaties.

Strategic Indicators to Watch

For policymakers and market analysts, the following indicators will be critical in determining whether a regional maritime architecture is forming or if the current fragmentation will persist:

• The implementation status of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding and its impact on Houthi naval activities.
• The confirmation or denial of formal diplomatic talks between the GCC and Iran in Salalah, Oman.
• The specific terms of the "conditional and reversible" trade agreements between GCC states and Iran.
• The legal responses of GCC states to any attempt to implement transit fees or tolls in the Strait of Hormuz.

Sources: intellinews.com, mofa.gov.ae, gdnonline.com, kurs.com.ua.